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Abstract 
 Non-custodial sanctions, particularly those that are implemented in the 
community, have different historical roots in common and civil law jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, various European instruments seek to shape the imposition and 
implementation of such sanctions uniformly across the continent. These 
instruments reflect an apparent consensus about penal values, culminating in 1992 
with the adoption of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures 
and of the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing. In spite of the apparent 
pan-European consensus, some tensions remained as a result of underlying 
doctrinal differences and of the compromises that were required to accommodate 
them.  
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 In the 21st century further European initiatives have sought to go beyond 
the 1992 instruments and focus on ‘what works’ and on the development of 
probation services. In the process, the central objective of penal reductionism, so 
important in 1992, has become somewhat marginalised. This shortcoming can be 
addressed by reconsidering the approaches that had been rejected in the earlier 
search for consensus and by developing a more comprehensive understanding of 
the human rights safeguards to which all penal sanctions should be subject.  
 
Keywords: community sanctions and measures, probation, Europe, suspended 
sentences, international standards, human rights, social control, rehabilitation.  
Introduction: Setting standards  
In Europe the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the apogee of standard setting for 
non-custodial sanctions. This was particularly true of community sanctions and 
measures, the implementation of which requires more detailed regulation than less 
interventionist non-custodial sanctions.2 This process culminated in 1992 with the 
adoption by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of both the 
European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures and the Recommendation 
on Consistency in Sentencing.  
 Taken together these instruments developed a comprehensive European 
penal policy on non-custodial sanctions. This policy set a clear course towards 
embracing what Christine Morgenstern (2002: 63) identified as the two broad 
solutions at the time for addressing the problems facing penal law: the 
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development of non-custodial sanctions that complied with the rule of law, and 
their substitution for imprisonment.  
By simultaneously and unanimously adopting the two instruments, the 
Committee of Ministers demonstrated that considerable consensus existed about 
the values the instruments contained.  In next section we consider the historical 
process by which this consensus was created. We then turn to the arguments that 
were rejected in the course constructing this consensus, before considering 21st 
Century attempts to go beyond the 1992 framework by developing further 
instruments focussed on the implementation of community sanctions and measures. 
It argues that these instruments unmoored the debate about non-custodial 
sanctions from their broader objective of reducing the level of penal intervention. 
Finally, we offer some thoughts on how to retain that priority.  
 
The basis of the underlying consensus 
What makes the consensus of the early 1990s surprising, in Europe in particular, is 
that historically there had been significant differences between the approaches to 
alternatives to imprisonment in the various jurisdictions. These differences are best 
illustrated by a brief and somewhat ideal-typical portrayal of their historical basis.  
The ‘pure’ suspended sentence. 
According to the classical model of criminal law, which dominated continental 
Europe from the late 18th century onwards, offences should be precisely defined, 
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with fixed penalties for every offence.  When an offence has been committed, it 
should be prosecuted without exception; following a conviction, the fixed penalty 
should be imposed without variation by the courts; and the punishment, typically 
imprisonment, should be implemented in full. In its extreme form this model is 
usually associated with the idealistic legality of the revolutionary French Code of 
1791, which gradually proliferated across much of Western Europe. The model 
sought to prevent the abuse of discretion by abolishing it at different stages in the 
process. Supporters argued that if punishment has been set appropriately in 
legislation, it would be proportionate to the crime and that it should apply equally 
to all who chose to break the law (Dupont, 1979). Their equal ability to choose how 
to conduct themselves was simply assumed (Pieth, 2001).  
From the second half of 19th century onwards the continental classical ideal 
came into conflict with positivist challenges to the notion of untrammelled choice. 
For positivists, offenders could be seen primarily either as innocents, whose crimes 
were the result of circumstance, or as hardened habitual criminals, whose capacity 
to choose not to offend had all but disappeared. Evidence showed that a depressing 
number of offenders committed further crimes, particularly those subjected to 
imprisonment. What was to be done? 
For those whose primary thinking was shaped by the classical ideal, the 
answer was to try and preserve resistance to abuse of discretion inherent in that 
model, while dealing with the reality that it did not always prevent crime effectively. 
Leaving aside the question of the ‘habitual’ offenders, the answer was an 
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alternative to imprisonment: a suspended sentence, at least for more (morally) 
innocent first and young offenders. Such offenders would have a proportionate term 
of imprisonment imposed upon them, but its coming into effect would be (wholly or 
partially) suspended for a period of time. If during that time the offender did not 
commit an offence his sentence would not come into effect. This approach had the 
advantage of preserving the notion that the offender had a choice to offend. He was 
simply given a further choice with the threat of additional punishment underlying 
the decision.  
Further conclusions flowed from this approach. Since the offender was 
capable of rational choice, there was no need to offer him any assistance or impose 
any restrictions during the period of suspension, other than the actual sentence if 
he was convicted of a further offence. Indeed, the distrust of discretion worked in 
the opposite direction. It was considered undesirable for the courts to have the 
power to judge individuals and to order tailored intervention in their lives – other 
than the loss of liberty which formally applied equally to all who were subject to it. 
For the same reason there should be no discretion in bringing suspended sentences 
into effect against those who had reoffended during the suspension period. 
The initial appearances of suspended sentences of imprisonment in 
legislation closely followed the restrictiveness of the classical model. Belgian and 
French legislation, of 1888 and 1891 respectively, provide primary examples of 
laws that permitted suspension of short sentences of imprisonment on the sole 
condition that the convicted offender not reoffend during the suspension (Ancel, 
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1971: 13-14). Much the same effect was achieved after 1895 in the territories that 
would become modern Germany, by routinely pardoning offenders on condition that 
they avoid reoffending (Meyer-Reil, 2005). 
From the late 19th century onwards, provision also began to be made in these 
countries for early release from prison. In its 19th century incarnation in France and 
Belgium, early release was often a form of ‘parole’ in which released offenders, 
unlike those whose sentences were suspended from the point of conviction, were 
subject to supervision in the community by civilian ‘comités de patronage’ 
(Christiaensen, 2004). Early release in these systems had a close connection to the 
ancient power of the sovereign to pardon, but was deployed more systematically to 
a growing range of offenders (Whitman, 2003).     
 Probation    
While the suspended sentence was emerging as an alternative to imprisonment 
within the broadly classical tradition, a very different model was developing in 
common law jurisdictions. This model was ‘probation’, regarded, initially at least, 
simply as a way of avoiding the formal imposition of punishment entirely and 
replacing it with some form of community-based supervision. Probation emerged 
almost simultaneously in England and in the US (Timasheff 1943a: 1-2). This 
reflected the pragmatism of the common law, with developments in the US serving 
as a source of continual inspiration for those in England.   
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Probation in Europe undoubtedly began in the United Kingdom (Vanstone, 2008). 
Although formally enshrined as a state institution only in 1907, the English 
probation movement traces its origins back further. In his centenary review of its 
development, Timasheff (1943a: 12-13) identified the origins of British probation in 
the work of a Birmingham judge in 1841, who was prepared to place ‘juvenile 
delinquents’ under the supervision of parents, masters, or volunteers. Nellis (2007: 
28) also pointed to a tradition in English penal practice as early as the 18th century 
of exercising ‘preventative justice’, which aimed to avoid the imposition of 
punishment in favour of judicial oversight. 
 The institutionalisation of English probation was primarily a product of 
Victorian civil society, rather than a principled development of the criminal justice 
system. 19th century English public discourse was characterised by both explicit 
moralism and considerable emphasis on charity as a response to social problems 
(Mair and Burke, 2012: 7-24). Both strands contributed to the formation of 
rudimentary analogues of modern probation institutions. Crime was viewed 
principally as a product of social and moral decay, which led, it was feared, to the 
creation of a ‘criminal class’ united against the prosperous middle-class mainstream 
(Emsley, 2010: 177-187). This inspired the intervention of numerous charitable 
organisations into the lives of offenders, which aimed to secure the spiritual and 
social ‘salvation’ of offenders by engaging with alcohol addiction. These 
organisations played a similar role to the civilian ‘comités de patronage’ in 
Francophone Europe, with the important difference that, unlike their continental 
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counterparts, they focused on offenders prior to (or instead of) formal sentence, 
rather than on released prisoners.  
Gradually these activities were incorporated into statute and the charitable 
interveners replaced with a formal secular institution, the probation service, created 
in 1907 (Nellis, 2007: 28-31). The activities comprising English ‘probation’ are 
diverse, having been accumulated piecemeal over the service’s existence (see 
McGarva, 2008: 269-278 for a comprehensive overview of modern functions). From 
the outset, the probation service was responsible for non-custodial supervision of 
offenders, especially juveniles. During the interwar years, the probation service 
expanded its role in adult justice and the probation officers’ trade union, the 
National Association of Probation Officers, campaigned with some success for 
probation supervision to be seen as a specialised ‘part of a wider social work 
“profession”’ (Nellis, 2007: 34). Critically, until the 1990s, this supervision was 
largely regarded as an alternative to punishment, the imposition of which was 
postponed conditionally: on the offender not reoffending or infringing other 
requirements of probation (Mair, 1998: 263). The focus was on the social work 
aspects of probation, summed up by the service’s famous injunction to ‘advise, 
assist, and befriend’ offenders (Canton, 2011: 30). Their responsibilities in this area 
continued to expand as a range of ‘community sentences’ other than supervision 
developed during the second half of the 20th century. 
 The English probation service also developed a key role in the ‘aftercare’ of 
ex-prisoners from the 1920s onwards, initially alongside wider civil society, but 
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formally taking over in 1965. This, in turn, morphed into a formal responsibility for 
the supervision of offenders released early from prison on parole (Maguire, 2007: 
399-401).     
Consensual synthesis or a synthetic consensus? 
The suspended sentences of continental Europe and the probation systems of the 
common law did not exist in separate silos. Even before the English probation 
system was enshrined in legislation, probation had been the subject of debate in 
the civilian-dominated ‘scientific’ conferences of the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
which adopted resolutions that were the early forerunners of the European 
standards of the 1990s. To take one example: the International Penal Law 
Association, established in 1889 by the three leading continental European criminal 
justice experts of their generation, Professors van Hamel of the Netherlands, von 
Liszt of Germany and Prins of Belgium, included in its constitution that the Society 
regarded the substitution of short terms of imprisonment by other equally effective 
punishments as possible and desirable.3 From its inception the meetings of the 
Society were also attended by representatives of common law countries, including 
both the UK and the US, who could and did accept this article of constitutional faith 
and simply interpreted it as applicable to the existing probation system. They also 
supported proposals for the increased use of carefully calibrated fines as less 
interventionist alternatives to imprisonment.4   
Gradual changes in national practice followed from this. In particular the 
continental European systems began to attach conditions to some of their grants of 
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suspension of sentences: this happened not only in the Franco-Belgian-German 
core but also in most other northern, western and southern European countries 
(Timasheff, 1943b: 1-62; van Kalmthout and Durnescu, 2008: 3-5, 10-12).   
As in England, volunteer bodies that had assisted prisoners in the 
Netherlands and other countries began to be transformed into ‘professional’ 
probation organisations. Typically, they too were employed directly or indirectly by 
the state and approached their task with a strong ‘social work’ focus, but operated 
inevitably in the penal shadow of the criminal justice system.  From the beginning 
these organisations had much in common when it came to dealing with released 
prisoners. Gradually their affinity increased in the area of implementing community 
sentences too, as suspension of imprisonment in continental Europe increasingly 
became conditional on submission to community sanctions and measures. By 1981, 
their interests were sufficiently common across Europe to allow the establishment 
of the 'Conférence Permanente Européenne de la Probation' (CEP) (Scott, 2006).  
The CEP included not only probation officers for the United Kingdom, where this 
term originated, but also officials responsible for working with offenders serving 
suspended sentences or who had been released conditionally in other European 
countries.  
After the Second World War, scientific conferences about non-custodial 
sanctions continued. In the early years the United Nations played a prominent part 
in shaping the debate in Europe and elsewhere. Thus in 1952 a European Seminar 
on Probation was held in London under the auspices of the Social Commission of 
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the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It revealed that there were 
still significant differences between continental European systems, in which the 
simple suspended sentence was the norm, and the common-law probation model, 
which still did not require a formal criminal conviction.  
Common ground was sought in probation techniques rather than law. At the 
London seminar, Marc Ancel noted the increasing professionalization of social 
workers involved in supervising offenders throughout Europe. He observed that 
various continental systems were making legal changes:  
The admission, timid at first, of probation into the criminal law of the 
Continent may thus contain the germ of later reforms which will tend to 
transform the old Continental criminal procedure into a modern procedure of 
défense sociale. (Ancel, 1952: 38)  
Ancel observed, however, that the concerns of the lawyers for procedural 
probity should and could be met, by linking probation to the existing institution of 
the suspended sentence.5  
The United Nations continued to play a significant role in the development of 
alternative sanctions in Europe, particularly through the work of its formal affiliate, 
the Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI). A major HEUNI 
conference in 1987 brought together participants from Western and Eastern Europe 
to discuss a study of non-custodial alternatives in Europe, which HEUNI had 
commissioned (HEUNI, 1988; Bishop, 1988).  
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At the same conference it became clear, however, that the (regional) 
initiatives of the Council of Europe had begun to overtake the United Nations on 
non-custodial sanctions. The first of these was a failure: In 1964 a European 
Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released 
Offenders was adopted by the Council of Europe. However, in practice the 
Convention has been used very rarely: by 2008 it had been ratified by only 12 
states, several of which made lengthy reservations. 
Subsequently, however, the Council of Europe was much more successful in 
shaping the European debate about the form that non–custodial punishments 
should take. This was reflected in an impressive list of Resolutions and 
Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers. Three stand out.  The first was 
the 1965 Resolution that dealt briefly with ‘Suspended Sentences, Probation and 
Other Alternatives to Imprisonment’. It emphasised the ‘disadvantages’ of 
imprisonment and in its key substantive provision combined the 19th Century view 
of the place of the suspended sentence with notions of probation, recommending 
that Member States legislate to allow for the alternation of imprisonment with ‘a 
conditional measure (suspended sentence, probation order, or similar measures)’ 
for first-time or minor offenders. 
A second resolution in 1970, on the ‘Practical Organisation of Measures for 
the Supervision and After-care of Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released 
Offenders’, further blurred the differences between suspended sentences and 
probation by encouraging the general use of conditional non-custodial sentences. It 
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also supported conditional release for offenders with criminal records, as part of its 
explicitly stated objective of avoiding the use of imprisonment. 
In 1976 a third Resolution, ‘on Some Alternative Penal Measures to 
Imprisonment’, followed. It confidently identified a ‘tendency, which is observable 
in all member states, to avoid prison sentences’, and proposed that Member Sates 
adopt  a common crime policy. The substance of the Resolution recommended that 
member states remove legal obstacles to imposing alternatives to imprisonment 
and suggested the expanded use of various practical measures, such as increased 
housing for probationers and community work, as well as the use of fines on a 
broader basis.  
The 1976 Resolution was based on a detailed study conducted by the 
European Committee on Crime Problems (1976) of the Alternative Penal Measures 
to Imprisonment that were then available in the Council of Europe member states. 
A feature of this study was the depth of its analysis. It began by situating criminal 
justice in the context of wider social policy and emphasised that other systems of 
social control had a key part to play, not only in assisting the criminal justice 
system but in avoiding invoking it at all. It recognised the stigmatising effect of 
every institutional form of social control including criminal justice interventions and 
therefore argued that all penal interventions, custodial or otherwise, ought to be 
used as minimally, and to intervene in offenders’ lives as little as possible. While it 
noted that ‘for many offenders supervision on probation was likely to be at least as 
effective in preventing recidivism as a custodial sentence’, it unanimously 
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supported the more extensive use of fines, which it found had even lower 
recidivism rates than imprisonment or probation (European Committee on Crime 
Problems, 1976:28).        
In 1986 Rentzman and Robert built on this study as the basis for a further 
report, Alternative Measures to Imprisonment, which they presented to the annual 
Conference of Directors of Prison Administrations, held by the Council of Europe. In 
this report, the differences between a suspended sentence and probation order are 
effectively buried: they were simply described as ‘different legal forms of probation’ 
(Rentzman and Robert, 1986: 9). The Conference of Directors of Prison 
Administrations endorsed the 1976 Resolution, but went further and called for the 
Council of Europe to develop ‘basic rules for the administration and implementation 
of non-custodial sentences once the offender had been declared guilty’ (Rentzman 
and Robert, 1986: 35). Such Rules, the Conference of Directors insisted, should 
include a code of ethics for those responsible for enforcement and safeguards for 
offenders’ rights, which would protect human rights in the implementation of non-
custodial sentences.   
The Rentzman and Robert report formed the basis for deliberations on what 
would eventually become the 1992 European Rules on Community Sanctions and 
Measures. One should not lose sight of the fact that the consensus that the 
Rentzman and Robert report represented was also consistently underpinned by a 
call for the reduction in the use of imprisonment.  
Comprehensive standards adopted (1988-1992) 
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Immediate support for the emerging European consensus was provided by two 
international instruments, the 1988 Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Implementation of Non-Custodial Measures involving the Restriction of Liberty 
(Groningen Rules) and the 1990 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-
Custodial Measures (Tokyo Rules). In order to understand the scope of the 1992 
European instruments, the European Rule on Community Sanctions and Measures 
and the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing, it is necessary to refer to 
the Groningen and Tokyo Rules too, as they crystalized the ideals of the time. Their 
influence on these key European instruments was considerable, not least because 
many of the same experts were involved in drafting them. Taken together, the four 
instruments give a snapshot of international standard-setting at perhaps the most 
crucial point in its development.  
The 1988 Groningen Rules were the first in this series. Although produced 
by an NGO, the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation (IPPF), and thus 
carrying no formal legal status, they were taken seriously because the IPPF's 
predecessor organisation, the International Penal and Penitentiary Council, had 
drafted what became the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners. The Groningen Rules represented ground-breaking 
standards drafted by a group of influential international academics and civil 
servants who, both as individuals and through the IPPF, sought to shape other 
standards being developed around the same time. Indeed, the preamble to the 
Groningen Rules noted that both the United Nations and the Council of Europe were 
already working in this area and invited them to make use of these new Rules.   
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The Groningen Rules focussed narrowly on interventionist non-custodial 
measures. The Commentary to the Rules specifies that (1) they were not intended 
to be ‘instruments to promote the increased use of non-custodial sanctions and 
measures in general’ (IPPF, 1988: 18) and (2) they did not deal with general crime 
and sentencing policy. They focused primarily on the authorities responsible for 
enforcement and emphasised the human, civil and political rights of those subject 
to liberty restrictions in the community (Rule 4).  
In contrast to the Groningen Rules, the Tokyo Rules dealt predominantly 
with sentencing policy and safeguards against abuses.  They were intended ensure 
that Member States develop non-custodial measures ‘to provide other options, thus 
reducing the use of imprisonment, and to rationalize criminal justice policies…’ 
(Rule 1.5). According to the official Commentary, the purpose of the Tokyo Rules 
was an overall reduction of imprisonment, i.e. both the number of custodial 
measures imposed and the actual length of any such deprivation (United Nations, 
1993: 7). The Rules were to ‘be part of the movement towards depenalization and 
decriminalization’ (see Rules 2.6 and 2.7). The official Commentary warns 
presciently:   
Respect for individual rights and freedoms as set out in international 
instruments requires that penal measures should not be imposed where they 
cannot be justified using strict criteria. Since non-custodial measures are 
less intrusive than custody there is a danger that they may be imposed even 
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when the development of society would no longer require it. (United Nations, 
1993: 10)  
Though both the Tokyo and Groningen Rules sought to balance their wider 
penal policy pronouncements with human rights concerns, the Tokyo Rules had one 
distinct limitation: Rule 1.3 provided that:  
The [Tokyo] Rules shall be implemented taking into account the political, 
economic, social and cultural conditions of each country and the aims and 
objectives of its criminal justice system.   
This qualification rather undermined the thrust of the Tokyo Rules, virtually inviting 
countries to justify their existing practices on the basis of prevailing conditions 
instead of re-examining them in the light of human rights principles (Morgenstern, 
2002: 86). Could European instruments give tighter protection to human rights, 
while retaining the reductionist focus of the Tokyo Rules? 
The answer is yes. The European Rules on Community Sanctions and 
Measures more effectively balanced the reductionist focus of the Tokyo Rules with 
tighter protection of human rights. Additional guarantees included respect for 
privacy and dignity of offenders (see rules 20 to 29). The principle of legality was 
also highlighted: community sanctions and measures must be defined in law and 
cannot be of indefinite duration; procedures for imposing and enforcing them must 
be specified in law too (Rules 3 -11). In addition, the Recommendation on 
Consistency in Sentencing, adopted by the Council of Europe in the same year, saw 
community sanctions as part of a wider range of non-custodial sentences, and met 
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the reductionist requirements of the Tokyo Rules by requiring that imprisonment 
become a measure of last resort imposed for  the minimum period possible 
(Ashworth, 1994).  
Neither the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing nor the 
European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures is ‘hard law’ in the sense of 
being a binding treaty. At the time, however, they seemed to provide a legal basis 
for the entrenchment of a comprehensive and eventually binding legal framework 
that would prevent the abuse of community sanctions within the Council of Europe 
regime (Van Zyl Smit, 1993). It would not have been unreasonable to predict that, 
as the legality principle was extended to cover community sanctions and measures 
more comprehensively, their legitimacy would be increased too. Around that time 
this was beginning to happen with similar international and European rules for 
prisons (Van Zyl Smit, 2013), which the European Rules on Community Sanctions 
and Measures sought to parallel. Before tracing how this would develop further, 
however, we need to consider some of the ideas that were not incorporated in the 
1992 instruments. 
 
Existing ideas underplayed in the lead up to 1992 
Liberal scepticism  
The eventual acceptance of comprehensive European standards for community 
sanctions and measures meant that some existing ideas had to be abandoned. One, 
19 
 
voiced during the run-up to the Groningen Rules, was a liberal scepticism towards 
international rule-making in this area. In a remarkable paper presented to an IPPF 
colloquium in Poitiers in 1987, William Bohan, a senior civil servant in the English 
Home Office, argued that although interventions aiming to reduce prison 
populations were desirable, international rules were badly suited to regulating them 
(Bohan, 1989). In his view, successful intervention emphasised the non-criminal 
justice aspects of community treatment. His approach reflected a revival of neo-
classical ideals, under which offenders were expected to take responsibility for their 
conduct. Meeting their social needs should not be the function of penal institutions, 
lest these institutions become disproportionately repressive. 
The model of traditional English probation was prominent in Bohan’s 
presentation. He referred approvingly to ‘the professional casework relationship in 
which the probation officer’s warm and sincere concern fertilises the probationer’s 
capacity for growth and change’ but asked rhetorically: ‘are there to be standard 
minimum rules for the practice of friendship?’ Bohan (1989: 46). Although he did 
not argue that there should be a separation between the social work and purely 
penal aspects of community sanctions - that is, that steps should be taken to 
ensure that offenders could be sentenced to social work – Bohan played down the 
abuses that could arise in both social work interventions and in the more restrictive 
aspects of community sanctions. He concluded that in any event, given divergent 
practices in this area, the development of international standards for community 
sanctions was premature. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, Bohan’s conclusions were not supported by any 
other IPPF member. Many of them, like the chairman, Hans Tulkens (1989), simply 
stressed that international standards were needed to protect persons subject to 
community sanctions against abuse.  
One of the most interesting responses to Bohan came from Edgardo Rotman, 
who was already establishing his reputation as a leading theorist of rehabilitation. 
According to Rotman (1986), rehabilitation should be seen not as a philosophy 
favouring paternalistic and oppressive forms of intervention in offenders’ lives but 
rather as offenders' right to enjoy opportunities to improve themselves. He 
conceded that Bohan correctly questioned whether there are minimum standards 
for friendship but argued that the function of minimum standards was to create 
‘certain objective conditions that make interpersonal action possible and 
meaningful’ (Rotman, 1989: 170). He explained that such rules ‘not only help to 
avoid abuses in state intervention but also establish positive duties of the state to 
provide certain services and opportunities with a minimum degree of quality and 
frequency’ (Rotman, 1989: 170). As explained below, this notion of a positive duty 
on states to provide opportunities for offenders was adopted by supporters of an 
expanded role for community sanctions in the future. 
Bohan’s remarks were made in the context of a debate about a specific 
proposal to introduce rules to govern community sanctions and measures and one 
can understand why they were resisted. What was missing in the wider debates of 
the late 1980s was any explicit discussion of the ‘traditional’ suspended sentence, 
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that is, one placing no additional burden on the offender other than the injunction 
not to reoffend.  
There was some support for these ‘pure’ suspended sentences on the 
grounds that they did not intervene unnecessarily in the lives of those subjected to 
it. However, proponents of intervention were on the rise.  Looking back on this 
period, the Cambridge criminologist, Sir Leon Radzinowicz expressed his contempt 
both for the pure suspended sentence and for sentences suspended on more 
elaborate conditions: 
I turned against [the suspended sentence] in the most categorical terms. I 
tried to show that [it] was largely used on the continent faute de mieux, 
simply because they did not have probation or conditional discharge; that in 
comparison the suspended sentence was definitely inferior; and if added to 
probation and conditional discharge it would harm their basic distinctiveness 
and in practice confuse both the offenders concerned and the courts. 
(Radzinowicz, 1999: 329).  
Radical non-interventionism 
Support for the traditional suspended sentence may have been expected, especially 
for those who favoured various forms of penal non-interventionism. In Europe a 
movement favouring radical non-interventionism (cf. Schur 1973) had been taking 
shape in academic penology since the late 1960s, and was much bolstered by the 
widely published finding that in the sphere of rehabilitation, ‘nothing works’ 
(Martinson, 1974).   
22 
 
 In Europe, radical non-interventionism took the form of an abolitionist 
critique of the prison as the site of penal processes (van Swaaningen, 1997: 116-
130). Some Europeans from this tradition were prepared to work with the Council 
of Europe in order to propose reforms that would reduce the scope of criminal law 
in society generally (Cf. Hulsman, 1980, 1984). However, they do not appear to 
have engaged directly in the 1992 standard-setting on non-custodial sanctions.  
 Perhaps it was the extent to which the standards of this period collectively 
held out the promise of a reduction in prison population that led European 
abolitionists to pay little attention to them and certainly not to critique them 
directly. In fairness, recommendations of the Council of Europe adopted in 1992, 
and subsequently in the rest of the 1990s, could be seen to give hope to more 
incremental abolitionists, who reluctantly accepted that the abolition of prisons 
could not be achieved in a single step. Thus the 1999 Recommendation concerning 
Mediation in Penal Matters saw its objective as encouraging ‘more constructive and 
less repressive penal outcomes’. Even more to the point was another reductionist 
recommendation adopted in 1999 concerning Prison Overcrowding and Prison 
Population Inflation. Basic Principle 1 of this Recommendation provided:   
Deprivation of liberty should be regarded as a sanction or measure of last 
resort and should therefore be provided for only where the seriousness of 
the offence would make any other sanction or measure clearly inadequate. 
Penal abolitionists ought perhaps to have been worried about Basic Principle 4 of 
the same Recommendation:    
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Provision should be made for an appropriate array of community sanctions 
and measures, possibly graded in terms of relative severity; prosecutors and 
judges should be prompted to use them as widely as possible.        
Why did it not continue to say ‘in order to replace sentences of imprisonment’ or 
words with similar effect? In the 1990s it may have been reasonable to assume 
that this was implicit in the context of the Recommendation as a whole. In the 
following decade, however, this assumption could not readily be made, as the next 
section demonstrates.   
  
Ambiguities in 21st century standards  
Close analysis of 21st century Council of Europe recommendations related to non-
custodial sanctions reveals a change of emphasis. The inherent value of these 
dispositions began to be highlighted and less attention was paid to prison 
population reduction or offenders’ (human) rights. 
Effectiveness of community sanctions 
This change emerged in 2000 with the adoption of the Recommendation on 
Improving Implementation of the European Rules on Community Sanctions 
and Measures.  The Commentary to this Recommendation reveals a subtle 
shift in the underlying attitude. While a ‘nothing works’ philosophy had 
previously predominated, Canadian research (e.g. Gendreau and Andrews, 1990) 
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and extensive meta-analyses supported a more optimistic view. The development 
of cognitive-behavioural and psycho-social interventions greatly improved the penal 
state’s capacity to help offenders readjust (para.30).  The Commentary concluded 
confidently that: 
These methods, based on accepted theories are increasingly being used as a 
basis for national strategies to improve the effectiveness of community 
sanctions and measures. (para. 140) 
 This conclusion reflects the 'what works' strategy championed by Sir Graham 
Smith, chairman of the committee of experts that advised on this Recommendation, 
as an antidote to ‘nothing works’ pessimism. In his preparatory paper, Community 
Sanctions and Measures – What Works, Smith (1998) expressed support for the 
risk-needs-responsivity model underpinning the ‘what works' strategy. 
The 2000 Recommendation reflected this positive commitment to the use of 
community sanctions. While it still referred to human rights, it focused on 
community sanctions and measures primarily as a means of risk management. 
Indeterminate community sanctions, previously outlawed by the European Rules on 
Community Sanctions and Measures, were now acceptable if someone posed a 
continuing grave threat to life, health or safety in the community. The emphasis 
was now on the ‘effective supervision and control of offenders’ (Rule 15) as a way 
of making ‘adequate provision for community safety’ (Commentary on Rule 19).  
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Moreover, the 2000 Recommendation was a tool for propagating the use of 
community sanctions and measures. The Commentary stated that ‘difficulties 
exist[ed] notably, but not exclusively, in eastern and central European countries 
where opportunities to use community sanctions and measures [were] often in an 
early stage of development’ (para 154). It hinted that it was up to European 
countries with well-established community sentencing regimes to overcome these 
difficulties.  
Effectiveness through intervention 
The same commitment to community based programmes was reflected in the 2003 
Recommendation concerning Conditional Release (Parole). As has become apparent, 
the mechanism of imposing a sentence, then suspending it conditionally, in whole 
or in part, and thus releasing the offender was one of the most important bases of 
non-custodial punishment in Europe. By the beginning of the 21st century many 
such sentences differed little from the conditional release of prisoners who had 
already served part of their terms of imprisonment. Statistics in Germany still lump 
together offenders whose prison sentences are suspended conditionally 
immediately on imposition and those who are released after having served part of 
them in prison (Dünkel and Pruin 2010).  
Historically, suspension and sometimes also early release were subject only 
to the single condition that offenders not commit further offences during the period 
of suspension. Only gradually were further conditions attached. Even so, across 
much of Europe the majority of suspensions and many releases from prison still 
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take place subject to the single condition to avoid reoffending. The motivations for 
not imposing further conditions vary. They may be an expedient way of reducing 
prison overcrowding as cheaply as possible (Beyens et al, 2013). However, there 
may also be a principled policy, as in Finland, of making reoffending the only 
condition that can lead to re-imprisonment of both parolees and those with 
conditional sentences (Lappi-Seppällä, 2010). Yet Paragraph 1 of the 2003 
Recommendation defines conditional early release narrowly, as ‘the early release of 
sentenced prisoners under individualised post-release conditions’. The same 
Paragraph provides further: ‘Amnesties and pardons are not included in this 
definition.’ Paragraph 2 emphasises that: ‘Conditional release is a community 
measure.’  
The 2003 Recommendation on Conditional Release thus excludes from its 
ambit releases on the simple condition of not reoffending, as not sufficiently 
interventionist to count as ‘conditional’ for its purposes. What makes this more 
serious is that in some European countries, such as Germany (Dünkel and Pruin, 
2010) and Belgium (Snacken et al, 2010), the period during which a former 
prisoner will be subject to post-release conditions may routinely be significantly 
longer than the original prison sentence. 6  The practical outcome is that where 
additional conditions are imposed, prisoners refuse release because it means that 
they will be under state control for longer (whilst subject to a high risk of recall) 
than if they remain in prison.  
 The Recommendation on Conditional Release, as its preamble makes clear, 
was designed to reduce the prison population. Nevertheless, by its narrow definition 
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of ‘conditional’, the Recommendation may inadvertently7 encourage the setting of 
conditions, thus ignoring the injunction of the Tokyo Rules that restrictive penal 
measures should not be unjustifiably imposed. This can be explained by the 
growing confidence expressed in the Preamble to the Recommendation on 
Conditional Release that conditional release, in the interventionist way it is defined, 
is ‘one of the most effective and constructive means of preventing reoffending and 
promoting resettlement’.  
Transnational enforcement 
The next European instrument to address community sanctions was the 2008 
Framework Decision of the European Commission ‘on the application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the 
supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions’ (FD 947). It was 
designed to set up a more effective system for enforcing community sanctions 
imposed in one EU state on a national of another EU state. Again, the primary 
motive seems to have been to increase the use of community sanctions. Arguably 
though, this was not being done for its own sake but to reduce the use of 
imprisonment of foreign nationals, by enabling them to serve a community 
sentence in their own country (Morgenstern 2009). This positive view of FD 947 is 
reinforced by interpreting it as requiring emphasis of the social rehabilitative 
function of community sentences in its implementation (Snacken and McNeill, 
2012).   
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In practice though, FD 947 may prove as ineffective as the 1964 Council of 
Europe Convention. For one thing, FD 947 only applies to the 28 members of the 
EU. Moreover, despite undertaking to transpose FD 947 into national law by 6 
December 2011, by February 2014 only 14 EU member states had done, thus 
greatly restricting possible implementation for the time being. In addition, states 
have a right8 to opt out of certain Framework Decisions prior to 1 December 2014 
and it seems likely that the United Kingdom will do so with FD 947. 
The adoption of the FD 947 is significant in that it reflects a growing 
commitment of the EU to involve itself in penal matters, including non-custodial 
sentencing (Baker, 2013). Although the focus of the EU is still on implementing 
sentences on an inter-state basis, it now also has an interest in developing 
substantive standards for community sanctions, which will make it easier in the 
future for states to accept - and therefore implement where required - other 
European states’ sentences. However, with this interventionism comes the danger 
of community sanctions being used alongside, rather than in place of, other 
penalties.  
Legitimacy and effectiveness of probation services 
The most recent pronouncement on non-custodial sanctions is found in the 2010 
Council of Europe Probation Rules. It follows other 21st century instruments in that 
its primary purpose is to propagate community sanctions and measures and, in this 
case, also to entrench the position of probation agencies. To some extent this may 
be a product of the involvement of the CEP, which lobbied strongly for their 
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creation, contributed actively to their formulation, and now uses them as an 
example of what ‘Europe’ requires.9  
 
While the 2010 Probation Rules endorse the human rights protections of the 
European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures and on occasion even 
expand on them, they are in large part recommendations on how probation 
agencies should be run, and their status protected. One of the ‘basic principles’ of 
the Probation Rules is that: ‘Probation agencies shall be accorded an appropriate 
standing and recognition and shall be adequately resourced’ (Rule 10). The 
emphasis is not on the recognition of ‘community sanctions or measures’, or even 
‘probation’ as an activity, but on ‘probation agencies’.  
 
It is of course appropriate for the Council of Europe to attempt to set standards 
for and generally develop the skills of criminal justice professionals, be they police 
officers, judges or those involved with the implementation of sentences as prison or 
probation officers. One of strengths of the Council of Europe as a human rights 
organisation is that it has good access to the civil servants of its member states. By 
working with existing national bureaucracies the Council can often achieve greater 
state adhesion to its human rights objectives. However, the important difference 
between the Probation Rules and similar recommendations about prisons is that, 
while the latter makes no case for the increased use of imprisonment, the Probation 
Rules seek to make a positive case for ‘probation' as the best way of dealing with a 
large class of offenders. 
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What the 2010 Probation Rules have in common with other recent 
recommendations on aspects of non-custodial sanctions is their reliance on the 
‘what works’ approach.10 While there are some references to ‘desistance’ (Rules 57, 
76, glossary) and to the strength-based ‘Good Lives Model’ (Rules 66, 67), the 
Rules are heavily influenced by the ‘Risk-Need-Responsivity’ model of ‘what works’ 
(Rules 66, 71).  What is largely absent is recognition that the ‘what works’ 
movement, has been subject to sustained academic critique of both the narrowness 
of its specific methods (Ward et al, 2012) and its indifference to the wider social 
impact of its primary focus on dehumanising ‘risk factors’ (Mair, 2004). Indeed, 
Rule 66 requires that assessments ‘shall’ be made using what is essentially the 
Risk-Needs-Responsivity approach, thus applying concepts that may be literally 
incomprehensible to officials not schooled in that tradition (Herzog-Evans, 2011: 
121).  
Missing from the Probation Rules is any systematic attempt to link the Rules 
to the objective, mentioned in its Preamble, of reducing the prison population. It is 
likely that expanding probation agencies, which the Rules encourage and promote, 
will facilitate greater use of particular kinds of community sanctions and measures, 
but will that necessarily reduce prison numbers? What are the relative costs and 
benefits both to offenders and broader society of more ‘probation’ as opposed to 
less interventionist alternatives? These questions are not posed directly by the 
Probation Rules or the Commentary on it.  
 
31 
 
Conclusion: The way forward 
 Increasingly, pan-European organisations, not only the Council of Europe but now 
also the European Union, have involved themselves actively in the introduction and 
implementation of community sanctions and measures (Canton, 2009a, 2009b: 73-
74; cf. Baker, 2013). Such sanctions are more interventionist than fines and 
sentences suspended on the sole condition of not reoffending, which in recent years 
have not been promoted as vigorously. Pan-European organisations such as the 
CEP have sponsored the development of Western European-style ‘probation’, 
particularly in central and eastern European countries. The EU has also played a 
role through its support for large research programmes on community sanctions 
and measures (McNeill and Beyens, 2013).  
With the extra money and resources being invested in community sanctions 
and measures, pressures to propagate probation are greater than ever. The 
distance between the 1992 commitment to (incremental) abolitionism and the 
modern state of play in Europe – which is swiftly approaching a state of ‘mass 
supervision’ (McNeill and Beyens, 2013) - ought not to be understated. 
Under these circumstances, the time is ripe to critically re-evaluate 
arguments from the perspectives of liberal scepticism and radical non-
interventionism that were made in the past, as well as those from a human rights 
perspective, in order to ensure that probation, as it has now evolved, does not 
become an unnecessarily restrictive response.  
32 
 
Liberal scepticism       
The liberal sceptical argument advanced by Bohan (1989) did not reject 
ameliorative intervention in social problems of the kind offered by traditional social 
work designed simply to help those in need. It challenged whether this could be 
done through a regulated system of community sanctions.  
That challenge remains. There is a risk that the positive claims made for 
community sanctions and measures lead to disproportionate interventions. 
Moreover, taking into account the social vulnerability of many offenders and victims, 
we should question whether the social work assistance that they require could 
possibly be better provided outside the penal system.   
In particular, the move away from the simple suspended sentence should be 
re-examined. One needs to ask whether offenders would not be better handled if 
they were routinely given sentences suspended on the sole condition that they not 
reoffend for a set period.  It would then be left to other, external social support 
systems to assist them during the period of suspension and make it less likely that 
they will relapse into crime. Such a development would provide a solution where 
offenders refuse early release from prison because they find the accompanying 
conditions of ‘probation’ too onerous, and object to their being enforced for longer 
than the duration of the prison term.11  
Radical non-interventionism  
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In its European guise radical non-interventionism focused largely on prison 
abolitionism. A revival of its ideas would pay much more attention to less 
interventionist non-custodial punishments such as fines, which in some jurisdictions, 
such as England and Wales, have been replaced to a significant extent by 
community sanctions and measures (Cavadino et al, 2013: 120). Such a revival 
would note that this trend is not universal. In jurisdictions such as Belgium 
(Snacken, 2007) and Germany (Sevdiren, 2011: 183), fines still play a large part in 
the overall framework of penal sanctions without any apparent loss of efficacy of 
the system as a whole. A revived radical non-interventionism could emphasise the 
contrast between relatively non-interventionist punishments and community 
sanctions and measures, which restrict liberty to an extent that in some cases can 
parallel or even exceed the pains of imprisonment. For community sanctions and 
measures this has been acknowledged by some European scholars (see Boone, 
2005) but has not really fed into the European debate about the desirability of the 
expanded use of community sanctions as opposed to other non-custodial sanctions.  
 The early critique of rehabilitationism by radical non-interventionists is 
widely rejected because it allegedly addressed only the straw-man of deterministic 
forms of compulsory rehabilitation. Defenders of community sanctions argue that a 
more sophisticated understanding of rehabilitation has now emerged (McNeill, 2009; 
Canton, 2007, 2011: 41-45; McKnight, 2009).  Such an understanding was 
developed by Rotman (1986, 1989) who argued that the right of the offender to 
opportunities to rehabilitate himself held the key to constructing forms of 
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community sanctions that recognise offender agency and are both ‘positive’ and 
human rights compliant.  
 This argument is not without merit. Certainly for offenders in whose lives the 
state intervenes by way of punishment, a case can be made for recognizing their 
right to opportunities to improve themselves. However, such a case is subject to 
two qualifications. First, there must be recognition that even the rehabilitative 
measures advocated by supporters of the expanded use of community penalties do 
involve elements of compulsion. 12  To this extent the original radical non-
interventionist critique is still directly relevant.  
 Secondly, it must be recognised that for offenders to be able to exercise a 
right to rehabilitation in the positive sense that term is used by Rotman (1986) - or 
a right to reintegration, as it is sometimes termed (cf. Dwyer, 2013: 10) - 
appropriate material and social conditions must be in place. As Carlen (2013) has 
forcefully observed, the right to rehabilitation based on rational choices being made 
by the offender may be illusory, for it often presumes socially competent offenders 
who were at one stage part of a stable, non-deviant community to which they can 
return. For many offenders in unequal, class-bound societies, such a community no 
longer exists – if it ever did (Lacey and Zedner, 1995). Under such circumstances, 
which may be far more prevalent than governments or even scholarly proponents 
of intervention are prepared to recognise, the judicious exercise of the prerogative 
of mercy leading to unconditional release may still be more effective in giving 
offenders opportunities to lead crime free lives.    
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Human rights    
Human rights idealism was a key element in the creation of the instruments 
discussed in this paper. Whatever weaknesses they may have, these instruments 
all seek to reinforce the position of offenders who serve their sentences in the 
community. This was true not only in 1992 but also thereafter. Also, the most 
recent of these instruments, FD 947 and the Council of Europe Probation Rules, 
express their commitment to human rights values and seek to entrench them. 
However, at the same time, these instruments encourage interventions in 
offenders’ lives that may limit their freedom more than is strictly necessary.  
How are these negative consequences to be avoided? One way may be by 
reemphasising one of the longest recognised human rights, namely the right to 
liberty (Hudson, 2001; Snacken, 2006). Our overview has shown that the 1992 
instruments sought to balance the needs for intervention by constantly questioning 
whether liberty-limiting interventions, custodial or otherwise, were required at all.13 
A second way of avoiding negative consequences is to reflect on the range of 
human rights that need to be considered when developing instruments to shape 
non-custodial interventions, for the pains of probation may encompass a broader 
range of human rights than liberty alone (Durnescu, 2011). In this regard human 
rights lawyers may seek, for example, to deploy the European Rules on Community 
Sanctions and Measures to support arguments that community sanctions that 
stigmatise offenders by making them wear clothing that publicly identify them as 
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person undergoing punishment, are degrading and therefore contrary to Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.14    
However, old nostrums may not be sufficient. It may be that a broader 
appreciation of human rights is necessary for the full consideration of the 
appropriate use of community sanctions and measures in Europe. In particular, 
overall socio-economic development, underpinned by a recognition of the minimum 
social and economic and cultural rights that all members of society are entitled to 
enjoy, is a more effective way of reducing crime than focusing intensively on the 
individuals, who are convicted of the relatively routine offences that are the target 
of community sanctions and measures. Consistently asking broader questions of 
this kind could allow European penologists to engage with broader social 
developments and to remain critical towards the wider (human rights) implications 
of any form of penal intervention (Loader and Sparks, 2013).    
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Notes 
 
1 The idea was first expressed by the philosopher and orator, Themistius, in a 
speech to the Christian emperor Jovian (362-363 AD), congratulating him on not 
seeking to impose his own morality on his subjects by legislation (Lee, 2000).  
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2 This is because community sanctions and measures, as defined in the European 
Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures, ‘maintain the offender in the 
community and involve some restriction of his liberty through the imposition of 
conditions and/or obligations, and which are implemented by bodies designated in 
law for that purpose’.  
3 See Article 7 of the Satzungen der internationalen kriminalistischen Vereinigung 
recorded in (1890) 1 Mitteilungen der internationalen kriminalistischen Vereinigung 
3. 
4 Decided at the third annual meeting of the International Association for Penal Law 
at Kristiana (Oslo) 25 to 27 August 1891. See the (1892) 3 Mitteilungen der 
internationalen kriminalistischen Vereinigung 265-266.  
5  See also the plea at the same Seminar by Paul Cornil (1952) of Belgium for the 
establishment of guilt before the results of a social enquiry report that might 
recommend ’probation’ was revealed to the trial court that might wish to impose it.  
6 Para 10 of the Recommendation does provide that: ‘Conditions or supervision 
measures should be imposed for a period of time that is not out of proportion to the 
part of the prison sentence that has not been served.’ This is a weak provision and 
the Commentary makes it clear that the duration of such supervision can exceed 
the term of imprisonment initially imposed by the court.  
7 Arguably, it was legitimate to focus the bulk of this Recommendation on the more 
interventionist conditions as release only on condition of not reoffending does not 
require rules to ensure that implementation is not harsh or unfair. However, the 
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unintended consequence is still the impression that wider conditions are required to 
make the release ‘conditional’ at all.   
8 See art. 10(4), Protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon on Transitional Provisions 
9 See http://www.cep-probation.org/page/332/european-probation-en-prison-rules 
accessed 16 February 2014. 
10 However, the Commentary goes on to make the point that countries should 
conduct their own research and remain ‘aware that “what works” in one country 
may not work as well in another’ (Official Commentary on Rule 104). 
11  See also American studies of ‘punishment equivalencies’, which have used 
quantitative surveys of offender opinion to demonstrate that those with experience 
both of imprisonment and its alternatives often prefer incarceration (Crouch, 1993; 
Wood and Grasmick, 1999).  
12 This is so even in jurisdictions where the offender’s consent is a prerequisite of 
the imposition of community sanctions or measures (cf. van Zyl Smit, 1993: 324-
326).  Central to any penal intervention is the issue of compliance, that is, of 
ensuring that the requirements of the sanction or measure are adhered to (Canton, 
2011: 123-126).  Whilst compliance must be secured on several levels (Bottoms, 
2001), it is ultimately mandated by law. Failure to engage with requirements 
imposed in the name of rehabilitation can lead to onerous consequences, potentially 
including incarceration. Under such circumstances the right to receive rehabilitative 
assistance easily becomes a duty to rehabilitate oneself. The more intensive the 
order, the more onerous that compulsion becomes. By contrast, unconditionally 
 
39 
 
 
suspended sentences impose only the same compulsion that criminal justice places 
upon all citizens: not to offend. 
13  Some of this sentiment remains at the pan-European political level: See 
Resolution 1938 (2013) ‘Promoting alternatives to imprisonment’, adopted by the 
Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, acting 
on behalf of the Assembly, on 31 May 2013. This Resolution carefully stresses that: 
‘non-custodial sentences should be imposed as a replacement for prison 
sentences and not as a way of further widening the scope of criminal 
punishment. Thus, minor offences which have hitherto not given rise to any 
criminal sanctions should not be punished by non-custodial sentences.’  
Unfortunately, the resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly have far less impact 
than recommendations of the Committee of Minsters of the Council of Europe as the 
latter represent the consensual views of the governments of member States. 
14  The European Prison Rules have been used very effectively in this way to spell 
out what should be regarded as degrading treatment of prisoners, contrary to Art 3 
of the ECHR: Van Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009.  
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